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In recent years, greater attention has been given to the
international coordination ofmonetary andfiscal policies
largely because of movements in the foreign exchange
value of the dollar and the increase in the U.S. trade
deficit. The emphasis on monetary and fiscal policies
reflects the view that both types ofpolicies contributed to
these developments. Policy coordination implies a greater
international dimension to the economic policies of the
u.s. and other major countries. However, the impact of
internationalconsiderations probablywillbe limitedsince
the goals ofpolicy coordination can be expected to be
consistentwith individual countries' domestic goals. In the
caseofU.S. monetary policy, although addedattention has
been given to international developments, policy appears
to have remained consistent with traditional domestic
goals.
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In late 1982, the U.S. economy began what has become
its longest peacetime expansion. Since then, real GNP
growth has been moderate to robust, unemployment in the
U.S has fallen sharply, and inflation has been moderate.
However, with the economy at or beyond full employment
in early 1989, the threat of an acceleration in inflation
became a concern.
Despite generally favorable domestic statistics, other
developments over the course of the current expansion
raised concerns in the U.S. and among many of its major
trading partners. In particular, international attention has
focused both on the foreign-exchange value of the dollar,
which soared and then plummeted during the 1980s, and
the high and persistent U.S. trade deficit.
While differences of opinion abound concerning the
implications of exchange rate movements and trade im-
balances, it is clear that these developments have sparked
interest in greater international coordination of monetary
and fiscal policies. The international emphasis on mone-
tary and fiscal policies reflects the view that both types of
policies have contributed to movements in exchange rates
and trade imbalances.
This paperexamines U.S. economic policy in the 1980s
in relation to the foreign exchange-value of the dollar, the
U.S. trade deficit, and the international coordination of
monetaryand fiscal policies. The first section examines the
theoretical arguments and some of the empirical evidence
on the effects of U.S. monetary and fiscal policies on the
value of the dollar and the U.S. trade balance. The second
section takes a critical look at prospects for relying on
international coordination of policies. The third section
examines the extent to which the goals of international
policy coordination havebeen consistentwith U.S. domes-
tic policygoals. A summaryand conclusions arepresented
in the last section.
3I. The Effects of Monetary and Fiscal Policies
The swing in the foreign-exchange valueof the dollar in
the 1980s has been dramatic. Chart 1 traces the index for
the nominal multilateral trade-weighted U.S. dollar ex-
change rate from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve and its real exchange rate counterpart. Both meas-
uresshowaprolongedrun-up through February 1985, then
a sharp drop through the end of 1987, and a subsequent
mild rebound in 1988.
As the dollar appreciated in the early 1980s, the U.S.
trade position deteriorated. As seen in Chart 2, the U.S.
moved from a trade surplus in real goods and services of
close to $80 billion (annual rate) at the end of 1980 to a
deficit of about $150 billion in late 1986. Since then, the
trade deficit in 1982dollars has improved some, but as of
the end of 1988, the deficit still was substantial, even
though the real exchange value of the dollar moved back
close to its level in 1980.
The.sharp changes in the.value of.the ••dollar and the
deterioration in the U.S. trade position have sparked de-
bate over their causes. Part of thedebate is overtheroles of
monetary policy versus fiscal policy. This section consid-
ers theoretical arguments and empirical evidence concern-
ing the relationship between movements in exchange rates
and the U.S. trade deficit, on the one hand, and on the
other, first, monetary policy and, then, fiscal policy.
Chart 1
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Economic Review I Spring 1989Real Exchange Rates and Monetary Policy
Monetary policy and real exchange rates are connected
through the effects of monetary policy on real interest
rates. Generally it is recognized that monetary policy can
affect real interest rates in the short run. Given its effects
onreal interestrates, the link between monetary policy and
the real exchange rate can be derived from the uncovered
interest parity condition.'
In its simple form, the uncovered interest parity condi-
tion posits that, with free mobility of financial capital and
perfect substitutability between foreign and domestic as-
sets, the difference between the log of the current nominal
exchange rate and the log of the future expected nominal
exchange rate is a function of the difference between
domestic and foreign nominal interest rates. 2 However,by
introducing current and expected prices (foreign and do-
mestic), the parity condition can be transformed into an
expression in which the real value of the dollar in the
current spot market is a function of two factors: 1) the
difference betweenUS. real interest rates and foreignreal
interest rates; and 2) the expected future exchange rate.
That is,
where qtis the real exchange rate (units offoreign currency
per unit of domestic currency deflated by the ratio of
foreign prices to domestic prices), r? is the real domestic
(US.) interest rate on securities with maturity n, r] is the
real foreign interest rate on securities of comparable risk
and maturity, and Et(logqt+ n)is thecurrent expected value
of the log of the real exchange rate n periods in the future.3
Tight monetary policy intheUS. relative tothat in other
economies could contributeto an appreciation of the dollar
by raising US. interest rates relative to those in other
countries. Withthe free flowoffinancial capital, thehigher
US.-foreign real interest rate differential would induce
gross capital flows that would cause the real value of the
dollar to appreciate.
Tothe extent that US. monetary policy affects the real
exchange rate through changes in the real interest rate
differential, the impact should not be permanent. That is,
in the above expression for the real exchange rate, for a
large enough n, the expected real exchange rate should not
be affected. 4 Allowing forshorter-runeffects, however,the
tightening of US. monetary policy that commenced in the
Fallof 1979had the potential to havea major impact on the
value of the dollar.5
Depicting the extent of this and other changes in mone-
tary policy in the 1980s via the monetary aggregates is
complicated by the distortions from financial innovations
and deregulation.6 It is better, therefore, to use movements
innominal and real short-terminterestrates tocharacterize
changes in monetary policy, though these are not ideal
indicators, either. As shown in Chart 3, the nominal
interest rate on federal funds increased sharply in late
1979, apparently in response to the tightening of monetary
policy that occurred then. In the second and third quarters
of 1980, the federal funds rate and other interest rates were
distorted by the Credit Controls of the Carter Administra-
tion. Interest rates were temporarily reduced by the artifi-
cial constraintsonbankcreditexpansion, but theybounced
back in late 1980 as monetary policy remained taut.
Chart 3
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5The behaviorofreal interestrates also is consistentwith
a tighteningof monetary policy in late 1979. Although the
measurement ofaantereal interest rates is complicated
by the needfor reliable measures of expected inflation,
thereislittle doubt that U.S. real interest rates had in-
creasedby 1981. Assuming thatthe expected inflation rate
for acurrentquarterisbasedonthe inflation rate prevailing
over the previous year,Chart4 reveals that short-termreal
interestratesjumpedup in the 1980sfrom levelsprevailing
in the late 1970s.
At the same time, real interest fates in other major
countriesalso rose, but by less thanreal interest rates in the
U.S.:Consequently, as shown in Chart 5, the differential
between real interest rates on-short-term, private, dollar-
denominated instruments and rates on comparable instru-
ments denominatedinother keycurrenciesrose in-theearly
1980s. Throop (1988) finds a similar pattern for estimates
of differentials on long-termreal interest-rates.
From the expressionfortherealexchangerate presented
earlier, a rise in U.S. real interestrates relative tothose of
other economies would appreciate the U.S . dollar. Indeed,
simulation results using the FederalReserve Bank ofSan
Francisco's structural macroeconomic model show- that
much of the appreciation of the dollarin the early1980s is
attributable to the 'differentialbetween U.S.:and foreign
long-teem interest rates. HelkieandHooper(1988)report
similar results regarding the effects ofinterest rate differ-
entials.
Tying the continuedclimb in the real exchangevalue of
the dollar beyond 1982to tight U.S. monetary policy,how-
Chart 4
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*Real rates are the nominal rate less the percentchange in CPI over the previous four
quarters. The U.S. rate is basedon the three-month commercial paper rate. The rate
for the GECD countries is based on a trade-weighted average of private market
rates.
Chart 5
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Economic .Review I Spring 1989ever, issomewhatmoretenuous.Itgenerallyisthoughtthat
theepisodeoftightmonetarypolicypersistedonlythrough
mid-1982. Theevidenceusuallycitedto supportthisview
isthe sharpdrop in the federalfundsrate at thattime.The
conventionalview, however, has to be seenin lightof the
reboundin realinterestratesduring1983,showninChart
4. Thebehaviorofrealinterestratessuggeststhat,through
mid-1984, the effective easing in monetary policy may
have been less than that indicated by the movement in
nominal-interest rates. As discussedbelow, this mayhave
beendue to other factors, such as fiscalpolicy, that were
affectingreal interest rates.
Whatever the sourcesof influence onreal interestrates,
theimportantpointforexchangeratedeterminationis that
the spread between U.S. real interest rates and foreign
interest rates was fairly constant from 1981 through mid-
1984 (Chart 5). This suggests that the real interest rate
differentialwasnotcontributingtothefurther appreciation
of the dollar that occurred throughearly 1985.
Fromearly1985 throughearly1987,however, themove-
mentsinnominalandrealshort-terminterestratessuggest
aperiodof monetaryaccommodation in theUS., as most
observers have acknowledged. During that period, the
US.-foreign real interest rate differential fell and the
dollardepreciated sharply, as wouldbe expectedfromthe
expressionfortherealexchangeratethatwasderivedfrom
the uncovered interest parity condition. Likewise, the
behaviorof the real interestrate differentialandthedollar
in1987 and1988areinkeepingwiththemovement toward
tighterUS. monetarypolicy, whichalsoisreflected in the
rises in nominal and real interestrates during theperiod.
Real Exchange Rates and Fiscal Policy
Thetheoreticaleffectsoffiscalpolicy(thatis, thenexus
of government taxation and spending decisions) on real
exchange rates depend on a number of factors. From
Mundell(1963) andFleming(1962), anincreaseindomes-
tic governmentspending will appreciate a domestic cur-
rencyiffinancialcapitalishighlymobile, butthecurrency
will depreciate if capital is not very mobile. Sachs and
Wypolosz (1984) also show that, in theory, the effect of
fiscal policy on the real exchange rate depends on other
factors such as wealtheffects.
Nevertheless,thewidelyheldviewisthatanexpansion-
ary US. fiscal policy will lead to an appreciation of the
realvalueofthedollar. EvidencefromBryantet.al. (1988)
supports this view. In the Brookings Institution project,
which involves simulation experiments with 12 of the
better-known multicountryeconometric models,fiscal pol-








expansionary US. fiscalpolicy stimulatesthe US. econ-





Hutchison and Throop (1985) emphasize that, evenwith-
out an effect on the real interest rate differential, an
expansionary US. fiscal policy can raise the levelof the
realexchangeratethatisexpectedtopersistoverthelonger
run.
Thiscanhappenif goods marketsare slowtoadjustand
US. and foreign goods and services are not perfect sub-
stitutes. Under these conditions, an expansionary fiscal
policyin theUS. (relativeto that of therest ofthe world)
canincreasetherelativedemandforUS.-producedgoods.
Even when world real interest rates are equal, capacity
constraintson the productionof goods and servicesin the
US. wouldmean an appreciation of the real valueof the
dollarinordertoeliminatetheexcessrealdemandforUS.
goods and services." Then, as long as the expansion in
fiscal policy were expected to persist, the real exchange
rateexpectedinthefuturewouldrise. Fromtheexpression
for the real exchange rate presented earlier, the higher
expected real exchange rate would mean a higher real
exchangerate today.
Theseargumentssuggestthatthe shiftto a moreexpan-
sionaryfiscalpolicyin the1980scouldhavecontributedto
ahigherrealvalueofthedollar. Withthe1981 TaxAct, the
ReaganAdministrationembarked on a programof taxre-
form that was intended to spur economic growth. The
programcut taxrates, whichreduced revenues, and intro-
duced a less progressive tax rate schedule. However, the
tax program had little in the way of offsetting spending
cuts. In fact, high-employment federal spendingas a per-
cent of high-employment GNP rose through 1986(Chart
6). The Tax Act also led to a jump in the federal high-
employment deficit after 1981. As seen in Chart 7, the
budget deficit rocketed from $30-$40 billion in the late
1970sto over $200 billion in 1986. As a percentof high-
employment GNP, the high-employment budget deficit
reacheda peak of over five percent.
Some have questioned whether the rise in the fiscal
budget deficit per se was expansionary. 9 Nonetheless,
7Hutchison and Throop (1985) and Throop (1988) present
persuasive empirical evidence that the federal fiscal defi-
cits have affected the real exchange rate. Both studies
emphasize the.effects of fiscal deficits working through
changes in the long-run expected real exchange value of
the dollar, rather than through changes in the real interest
rate differential. 10 Their findings indicate that, relative to
fiscal tightening in other countries, the prolonged fiscal
expansion associated with the rise in the U.S. budget
deficit after 1982 caused the expected exchange value of
the dollar to rise and led to the continued rise of the dollar
between 1982 and early 1985. Throop (1988) maintains
that the imbalances between foreign and domestic fiscal
policies also workedto buoy thevalueofthedollarthrough
1986, although after February 1985, the real value of the
dollarfell in response to the decline in thereal interest rate
differential.
Since 1986, fiscal policies internationally have been
somewhat more balanced. In late 1985, the Congress and
the Administration "committed" to reduce the budget
deficit through a resolution and subsequently the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings bill inDecember1985. Inpart due tothe
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings constraints, U.S. fiscal policy
has become less expansionary as measured by the high-
Chart 6
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*High employment deficit and GNP are based on a six percent unemployment rate.
8 Economic Review / Spring 1989employment deficitaswellasbyhigh-employment spend-
ing. Moreno (1988) also points out that there has been
some expansion of fiscal policy in other countries. He
discusses the6trillionyen(1.8percentofGNP)package of
spendingincreasesandtaxcuts approved by theJapanese
Cabinet in June 1987. Hutchison (1987) also identifies
changes in Japanese policy. In addition, according to
publications of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD), West Germany is pro-
jected to movetoward increasingits budgetdeficit to 2Y4
percentof GNP by 1992 from 1% percentin 1987.
Nevertheless, it is uncertainhowfiscal imbalances will
be resolved in the future. For example, the U.S. Con-
gressional Budget Office projects the budget deficit to
improve onlyslightly overthenextfive years (seeChart8).
If these projections are consistent with market expecta-
tions, fiscal policylikely still is holding up theexpected,
and, thereby, thecurrentrealexchange value ofthedollar.
u.s. 'frade Balance
The discussion so far has focused on the theoretical
arguments andempirical evidence relatingtotheeffects of
monetary andfiscal policiesontherealexchange rate.The
impact of monetary and fiscal policies on the real trade
balancealso depends on how thesepoliciesaffect overall
spending. Thisisbecauserealnetexports fortheU.S. are
relatedto boththerealexchange rateandrealspending in
the U.S. relativeto that in othercountries.





relative to exports, the second would have the opposite
effect.
TIle ambiguous effectof monetarypolicy on the U.S.
tradebalancecarries overto the empirical evidence from
theBrookings Institution project. In Bryantet. at. (1988),
someofthemodelsimulations suggestthattightmonetary
policywould increasethe U.S. tradedeficit, whileothers
show. the. opposite result. On average, the results of the
simulation showthatmonetary policyhasclosetoaneutral
effectonthe U.S. tradebalance. Therefore, evenif mone-
tary.policyaffectedthereal foreignexchange value ofthe
dollarinthe1980s, itmaynothavecontributed muchtothe
higher real trade deficit. This also means that explicit
attempts to influence the trade deficit by changing ex-
change rates through monetary policy might meet with
onlylimitedsuccess.
In contrast, theorysaysthat expansionary fiscal policy
can appreciate thedollarand raise U.S. spending relative
tothatin othercountries.Giventhatit appreciates thereal
dollarexchange rate,expansionary U.S. fiscal policyrela-
tive to that in other countries should have unambiguous
effects: such a policy should reduce U.S. net exports."
TIle resultsin Bryantet. at. (1988) supportthisviewof
theeffects offiscal policy. Mostofthemodelsindicatethat
theU.S. trade balanceis negatively relatedto U.S. fiscal
policy. Moreover, otherempiricalstudieshave found that
muchofthe riseintheU.S. tradedeficitinthe1980s canbe
tracedto expansionary U.S. fiscalpolicy. Throop (1988),
forexample, finds thatabouthalfoftheincreaseintheU.S.
tradedeficitin the 1980s canbe tracedto thefiscal policy
imbalance between the U.S. and other countries. 12 That
studyalso finds thata reductionin theU.S. budgetdeficit
from $230 billion in 1986 to about $150 billion by 1987
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Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 9II. Implications for PolicyCoordination
Recognition that monetary and fiscal policies can affect
exchange rates and trade balances is one reason more
attention is being given tothe international repercussions
of these policies. The recent attempts at international
economicpolicy coordination involving the US. grew out
of the G-5 (US., Gennany, Japan, Britain, and France)
Agreementin September1985.13Thatmeeting specifically
wasIIlotivated byadesireonthepartof the participants to
depreciate the dollar further. BySeptember 1985, the dol-
larhad depreciatedconsiderably from its peak in February
1985, but still was considered too high to resolve world
trade imbalances. In addition, the decline in US. real net
exports, which eventually hit a low in late 1986, was
thought to have created imbalances among sectors of the
U.S. economy,raising prospects forprotectionistmeasures
by the US. against its trading partners.> Finally, there
was concern over the long-run implications of US. re-
liance on foreign financing.P
The September 1985Agreement called forthe coordina-
tion of both fiscal and monetary policies to affectexchange
rates and the trade imbalance. The discussion in the
previous section suggests that these efforts to reduce fiscal
imbalances are reflected in the lower real US. trade
deficit. However, most of the efforts at coordination have
involved monetary policy,includingdomestic open market
operations and unsterilized currency intervention.w as
well as sterilized currency intervention.'? The discussion
in the previous section suggests that the coordination of
monetary policies (and sterilized currency interventions),
in contrast, probably has had a limited effect on trade
imbalances.
But is there another interpretation of the role of mone-
tary policy in international policy coordination? One inter-
pretation is that its role is one of "stabilizing" exchange
rates. When the dollar wasdepreciating sharply from early
1985 through 1986, exchange rate stabilization might be
characterized as aiming to smooth the downward adjust-
ment in the value of the dollar-that is, preventingitfrom
falling too rapidly. More recently, stabilizationappears to
be aimed at dampening short-run swings in the exchange
value ofthe dollar.
There is some debate regarding whetheritis appropriate
to damp movements in exchange rates. In general, stabili-
zation .in this sense is appropriate when fluctuations in
exchange rates mainly are due to teIIlPoraryshiftsin the
demand for money (or financial assets more.generally)
among different countries.18 Such temporary shifts could
be due to unstable investor demands forindividual curren-
cies. In this case, a shift in preferences toward holding
dollar assets wouldtend to appreciate thedollar andcallfor
arelative easinginUS. policy.On the other hand, ashiftin
preferences away from dollar assets would call for US.
policy to tighten in order to stabilize the dollar.
However,in the real world, weknow that exchange rates
also react to real shocks, both temporary and permanent,
as well as to longer-run shifts in thedemand formoney and!
or financial assets. Under these circumstances, the appro-
priate monetary response to movements in exchange rates
requires policymakers to be able to quantify the relative
importance of financial shocks and real shocks.'? It also
requires policymakers to be able to distinguish ex ante
whether exchange rate movements are due to temporary or
permanent shocks.s?
Tothe extent that the impactof real shocks and shifts in
long-run money demand are more important than the
effects of temporary money (asset) demand shocks on
exchange rates, gearing monetary policies to restrain the
value of the dollar too narrowly will tend to destabilize
economic growth and inflation. This is a serious problem
since more appropriate goals of monetary policy, such as
stabilizing nominal income growth or prices, would be
subverted.
III. U.S. Monetary Policyand International Coordination
This last point is not meant to rule out the usefulness of However,it is notclearthat exchange rates perseare the
international policy coordination in a broader context for appropriate basis for such coordination. Indeed, the goals
the US. TheUS. has an open economy and, as Bryant et. ofthe Federal Reserve, like those of most other central
al. (1988)point out, monetary policy in other major coun- banks ofcountrieswith large open economies, are stated in
tries can have real effects on the US. economy. Since the tenusofdomestic variables, such as sustainable growth in
international transmission of the effects ofpolicy depends the domestic economy and stable prices. International
in part on the stance of US. monetary policy relative to policy coordination clearly should not undermine or sacri-
that of other countries, U.S. policymakers can be more flee-these domestic goals. On the contrary, international
effective if policies are coordinated in some broad sense. agreements are possible only if the participants believe
10 Economic Review I Spring1989such agreements make itmore feasible to achievedomestic
goals.
In this view, exchange rate considerations should influ-
ence policy ifthey are consistentwith acountry's domestic
goals. To determine how this applies to the U.S., this
section examines whether U.S. monetary policy since late
1985 was influenced by exchange rate considerations that
were in conflict with domestic policy goals.
September1985Agreement
In the September 1985 Agreement among the G-5
countries, the concern wasover the high valueofthe dollar
andtheU.S. trade deficit. Tothe extent thatthe September
Agreement made it more likely that the imbalances among
thefiscalpoliciesoftheU.S. and its trading partners would
improve,theappropriate response of monetary policy was
to allow both real and nominal interest rates to fall.
Consistentwith these policy coordinationgoals, wedid see
a series ofreductions in the U.S. discount rate and a more
orless steady decline in the federal funds rate in 1986.
However,this stance of U.S. monetary policy also was
cOllsistentwith the goal of stimulating the domestic econ-
omy.· In 1986, the unemployment rate was above seven
percent, inflation was below three percent, and GNP
growth was slow.
EXHIBIT
Order in which Polley Variables
Appeared in the FOMCDirective
MEETING FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH FIFTH
3/85 to 7/85 MONETARY STRENGTH OF INFLATION CREDIT MARKET EXCHANGE
AGGREGATE EXPANSION CONDITIONS RATES
8/85 to 4/86 MONETARY STRENGTH OF EXCHANGE INFLATION CREDITMARKET
AGGREGATE EXPANSION RATES CONDITIONS
5/86 MONETARY STRENGTH OF FINANCIAL EXCHANGE
AGGREGATE EXPANSION MARKET RATES -
CONDITIONS
7/86 to 2/87 MONETARY STRENGTH OF EXCHANGE INFLATION CREDIT MARKET
AGGREGATE EXPANSION RATES CONDITIONS
3/87 EXCHANGE MONETARY STRENGTH OF INFLATION CREDIT MARKET
RATES AGGREGATE EXPANSION CONDITIONS
5/87 INFLATION EXCHANGE MONETARY STRENGTH OF
RATES AGGREGATE EXPANSION
-
7/87 INFLATION MONETARY STRENGTH OF
AGGREGATE EXPANSION - -
8/87 to 9/87 INFLATION STRENGTH OF EXCHANGE MONETARY
EXPANSION RATES AGGREGATE -
11187 FINANCIAL STRENGTH OF INFLATION EXCHANGE MONETARY
MARKET EXPANSION RATES AGGREGATE
CONDITIONS
12/87 to 5/88 FINANCIAL STRENGTH OF INFLATION EXCHANGE MONETARY
MARKET EXPANSION RATES AGGREGATE
CONDITIONS
7/88 MONETARY STRENGTH OF .INFLATION FINANCIAL EXCHANGE
AGGREGATE EXPANSION MARKETS RATES
8/88 to 11/88 INFLATION STRENGTH OF MONETARY EXCHANGE FINANCIAL
EXPANSION AGGREGATE RATES MARKETS
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 11Another source of relevantevidence is the Federal Open
Market Committee's monetary policy directives. Heller
(1988) argues that the order in which the variouseconomic
variables are mentioned in thedirective generally isconsis-
tent with the relative importance placed on these variables
in monetary policy considerations. As shown in the Ex-
hibit, which is updatedfromone inHeller (1988),theorder
in which exchange rates were mentioned in the directives
was raised from fifth in the meetings of March 1985
through July 1985 to third in the meetings of August 1985
through April 1986. This evidence suggests that U.S.
monetary policy placed greater emphasis on the exchange
value of thedollar, in line with the objectives spelled out in
the September 1985 Agreement. 21
Louvre Agreement
The Louvre Agreement of February 1987 marked the
explicit moveto the objective of stabilizing exchange rates
around their existing levels, rather that seeking to depreci-
ate the dollar further. Since then, exchange rate policy has
focused almost exclusively on monetary policy coordina-
tion.
As Cheng (1988) points out, the first nine months of
1987do notprovide us with a clear indication of theextent
to which exchange rate considerations augmented purely
domestic considerations. In 1987, the pressure on the
dollar generally was downward. At the same time, real
GNP growth was quite robust, inflation appeared to be on
the rise, and the unemployment rate had fallen to about six
percent by mid-year. Thus, the goal of exchange rate
stabilization was consistent with domestic developments.
Some tightening of policy was warranted, and the Federal
Reserve did sothroughout the Spring and again in Septem-
ber 1987.
One indication that exchange rates played a role in the
FOMC's decision to tighten in 1987 is that, in the March
and May 1987meetings of the Committee, exchange rates
were either the first or second item mentioned in the policy
directive.
Stock Market Breaks
One instance in which U.S. policymakers paid little or
no attention to exchange rate developments was after the
price breaks in world stock markets in October 1987. The
breaks reshaped the outlook for the U.S. economy. The
substantial loss of wealth was expected to cut into con-
sumption and housing demand, and business investment
was expected to slow.Perhapsevenmore importantly, there
was concern over a more general disruption to financial
markets stemming from the stock break. A heightened
12
emphasis on the state of financial markets is consistent
with the ordering of the policy variables in the FOMC's
directives for the meetings just following the problems in
the world stock markets. The response of the Federal
Reserve was to inject liquidity into the market and to drive
down interest rates, despite the downward pressure on the
dollar. In this case, stabilizing the exchange value of the
dollar was inconsistent with domestic developments, and
the Federal Reserve acted solely on the basis of domestic
concerns.
G-7 Agreement of December 22, 1987
The post-break employment developments in the U.S.
provided the early signals that the sharp drop in equity
values was not sending the U.S. economy into a tailspin.
Forexample, from October to December 1987, the U.S.
unemployment rate fell 0.2 percentage point to 5.8 per-
cent. A softening of concern over the effects of the stock
market break opened the door for resumption of interna-
tional policy coordination. Efforts to support the dollar
through currency intervention on the part of the G-7 (G-5
plus Canada and Italy) countries were resumed in late
December 1987and the first part of 1988.
However, clear signs of a tightening in U.S. monetary
policy were not seen until somewhat later in 1988. Chart 3
shows that the federal funds rate remained in the 6Yz to 6%
percent range through March of 1988. The stability of
short-term U.S. interest rates in the first part of 1988 is
consistent with a continued concern over the condition of
the U.S. economy, but not with a goal ofboosting the value
of the dollar.
Further into 1988, concerns over the dire effects of the
stock market break faded considerably. Forthe first half of
1988, real GNP growth in the U.S. was over three percent
(annual rate) and the unemployment rate, at 5.4percent by
July 1988, was at or below what most analysts view as the
natural rate of unemployment. Consistent with the per-
formance of the domestic economy, between March 1988
and the beginning of 1989, U.S. short-term interest rates
rose by 250 to 300 basis points, reflecting in part tighter
U.S. monetary policy.
The shiftinpolicy in 1988, then, came only when it was
fairly clear that the economy was strengthening and capa-
city constraints were signalling concern over inflation.
Thus, although U.S. monetary policy may have affected
the exchange value of the dollar in line with the objectives
of policy coordination, the shift in U.S. policy apparently
did not occur until domestic developments clearly war-
ranted it.
Economic Review / Spring 1989IV. Summary andConclusions
Movements in the foreign exchange value ofthe dollar
andthe increasein theu.s. tradedeficit have fostered in-
ternational agreements forpolicycoordination. The agree-
ments.call for the coordination of monetary and fiscal
policies·among the.large open economies. While some
progresshasbeenmadetoward.reducing fiscal imbalances
between the U.S. andothermajoreconomies, mostof the
effortsat international coordination have involved mone-
tary policy. ..
In the absence offurtherprogress in reducing theU.S.
fiscal deficit, it is questionable whether policycoordina-
tioncan reduceworldcurrentaccountimbalances. While
monetary policycanaffectrealexchange rates,it may not
have mucheffectonrealtradebalances. Thisraises doubts
about the appropriateness of centering the international
coordinationofmonetary policyontheexchange value of
thedollar, particularlyinlightofthedifficulties involved in
Federal Reserve Bankof SanFrancisco
discerning among various types of shocks to exchange
rates. Rather, policymakers internationally should focus
onthemoreappropriate rolesof monetary policy, suchas







specific moves to ease or tighten U.S. monetary policy.
But, whatever attention hasbeenpaidto policycoordina-
tion, the U.S. experience suggests that monetary policy
hasbeenfirstandforemost consistentwithdomestic devel-




1. See Dornbush (1976),Frankel (1979),Hooper and Mor-
ton (1972), and Hutchison and Throop (1985).
2. With perfect capital mobility and asset substitutability,
the uncovered interest parity condition is
log St - Et(log St+n) = n(i~ - iI),
where
s, the current nominal exchange rate (units of
foreign currency per unit of domestic cur-
rency).
it the nominal interest rate on a security with
maturity n(d denotes domesticand fdenotes
foreign).
Et(st+n) = the expected value at time t of the nominal
exchange rate n periods ahead.
If domestic and foreign assets are not perfect substitutes,
the expression above also would include a risk-premium
term.
3. See Hutchison and Throop (1985) for a discussion of
the uncovered interest parity condition and the determina-
tion of the real exchange rate.
4. If n is small, changes in monetary policy could affect
the expected inflation term. See Bryant et. a/. (1988) for
estimates of the effects of a change in monetary policy on
exchange rates and foreign and domestic prices.
5. The change in monetary policy was accompanied by
the adoption of nonborrowed reserves targeting operat-
ing procedures by the Federal Reserve from October
1979 through mid-1982.
6. See Judd and Trehan (1987) for an analysis of the
behavior of the aggregates in the 1980s.
7. Reporting on the effects of a contraction in fiscal policy
in Bryant et. al. (1988), it is stated: "All models simu-
lated sustained declines in U.S. interest rates adjusted
for inflation relative to ROECD (other OECD countries);
that change in the real interest rate differential works
to depreciate the inflation-adjusted value of the dollar."
8. In the case of increased government spending, for
example, the higher value ofthe dollar would workto offset
higher U.S. government demand for goods and services
by reducing private demand (both domestically and in
other countries) for U.S.-produced goods. The change in
private demand would result in a deterioration in U.S. net
exports. In this way, the appreciation of the dollar allows
goods markets to clear.
As Hutchison and Pigott (1984) point out, this effect also
could be associated with an expansionary fiscal policy
resulting from a revision in tax laws that increased the
after-tax return on investment, even if the fiscal budget
balance were not affected. In this case, the increase in
relative demand for domestic goods would come from
private investment.
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9. The neo-Ricardian theory, popularized by Barro
(1974),holds that the method used to finance government
spending (taxing or borrowing) does not affect aggregate
demand. The argument is that if the government relies on
debt, rational taxpayers will anticipate higher future taxes
and adjust theirsaving accordingly. The increase in sav-
ing wiUexactlymeet the increase in government borrow-
ing. This should leave the real interest rate and real
eXChange rates unaffected.
Ollehypothesis that is consistent with the neo-Ricardian
framework is that U.S. fiscal policy in the 1980s was
expansionary because the changes in marginal tax rates
made investment in U.S. assets relatively more attractive.
This, inturn induced capital flows, the appreciation of the
dollar and.the increase inthe trade deficit. It is not clear,
however, that investment relative to GNP in the U.S. has
been extraordinary during the current expansion. One
possible explanation is that the effects of the lower tax
rates on investment demand were offset by much higher
real interest rates in the 1980s.
10. There is considerable debate, both at the theoretical
and empirical levels, concerning the effects of fiscal
policy on interest rates. Hutchison and Pyle (1984), for
example, find that short-term real interest rates are sys-
tematically and positively related to central government
fiscal budget deficits. Evans (1985), on the other hand,
argues that the empirical evidence for the U.S. does not
support the view that higher nominal interest rates are
associated with large fiscal deficits.
11. The different implications of monetary and fiscal pol-
icy for the trade balance also may provide a partial
explanation for the slow adjustment of the U.S. trade
deficit and for its persistence through 1988, despite the
sizable drop in the value of the dollar. The decline in real
net exports was not reversed until the last quarter of 1986
(Chart 2).That is somewhat longer than the average lag in
the response of net exports to a change in the real
exchange rate. This longer lag is consistent with the
argument that the drop in the exchange rate in 1985was
related mainly to real interest rate changes reflecting a
relative easing of U.S. monetary policy, rather than a
correction in the international imbalances in fiscal pol-
icies.
This cannot be the whole story, however. Even when the
effects of monetary policy on income and exchange rates
are taken into account, macroeconomic models tend to
overestimate the improvement in the U.S. trade balance.
Other factors contributing to the slow adjustment in the
U.S.trade deficitare slower passthroughs of import prices
and the increased importance of the Newly Industrialized
Economies for which the dollar has depreciated less
compared to, say, the G-10 countries. These factors are
discussed in Glick (1988) and Moreno (1986).
12. Though difficult to quantify, the trade imbalance also
may be related inpart to factors such astrade barriers and
international debt problems. Trade barriers reduce the
Economic Review / Spring 1989total amount of international trade, and bilateral effects
depend on the relative strengths of the barriers. To the
extent that the neteffect of trade barriers is to reduce the
U.S. share of exports, the U.S. net export position would
shrink. International debt problems could reduce U.S.net
exports by lowering the demand for U.S. goods, if the
reduction in lending to LDCs with debt problems limits
their ability to finance trade deficits and forces themto cut
bCl.c~imports. Inaddition, the trade deficit may havebeen
affected by more attractive U.S. investment opportunities.
19· Glick (1986) discusses the motivations behind these
policy actions and alternative ways of conceptualizing
policy coordination.
14. This view is expressed in Johnson (1986). However,
Glick and Hutchison (1988, 1989a) present evidence that
suggests that the appreciation of the dollar did not dein-
dustrialize the U.S.economy. During the 1980s,manufac-
turing output relative to GNP has been stable.
15. The implications of the high U.S. trade deficit and the
corresponding U.S. reliance on foreign financing depend
on how domestic spending has been affected. To the
extent that the trade deficit has come about because of
higher U.S. investment, our reliance on foreign financing
doesnotrepresent afundamental problem. Higher invest-
menttodaycreates the productive meansfor repaying our
foreign debt without detracting from the standard of living
in the U.S. in the future. On the other hand, those that
express concern over the trade deficit argue that the
foreign funds are being used to finance higher private and
government consumption. This would mean that foreign
borrowing is creating a burdenwhich can be metonly by a
reduction in the standard of living in the U.S. inthe future.
16. See Hoskins (1989).
17. When a central bank increases or decreases its hold-
ing of foreign-denominated assets using unsterilized in-
FederalReserve Bank ofSanFrancisco
tervention, it changes its reserve liabilities. The effects on
the supply of money are similar to those of open market
operations in which the central bank changes its holdings
ofassets denominated in the domestic currency. Under
sterilized intervention, incontrast the money supply isnot
affected. In this case, the balance sheet of the central
bq.nk would show a swapping of assets denominated in
domestic and foreign currencies, without a change in
reserve liabilities.
18. See McKinnon 1982, 1985.
19. See Glick and Hutchison, this issue of the Economic
Review.
20.0neimportantsituation in which policymakers would
have information regarding the reason for a movement in
exchange rates is if further progress is made in reducing
the fiscal imbalances. Inthat case, monetary policy would
have a role as an adjunct to the adjustments in fiscal
policy. As argued above, to the extent that policy coordi-
nation is aimed at significantly reducing the trade im-
balance,its root cause, the international fiscal imbalance,
must be addressed. Assuming that most of the adjust-
ment comes from a tightening of U.S. fiscal policy, the
trade deficit would be reduced by the combination of a
lower real interest rate, a lower real exchange value of the
dollar, and lower U.S. spending. In this context, U.S.
monetary policy should facilitate the drop in nominal
interest rates as real interest rates decline. Obviously, the
international coordination of monetary policy should not
attempt to stabilize the real exchange value of the dollar,
but itshould allow the depreciation of the dollar stemming
from fiscal policy changes to proceed.
21. More recently, in testimony before the Congress, Fed-
eralReserve Chairman Alan Greenspan also indicated
the importance of the exchange value of the dollar in U.S.
monetary policy.
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